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WPA 2 (Wi-Fi Protected Access 2) Security 
Enhancement: Analysis & Improvement
A.K.M. Nazmus Sakib α, Shamim Ahmed σ, Samiur Rahman ρ , Ishtiaque Mahmud Ѡ & Md. Habibullah 
Belali¥ 
Abstract - WPA and WPA2 (Wi-Fi Protected Access) is a
certification program developed by the Wi-Fi Alliance to 
indicate compliance with the security protocol created by the 
WiFi Alliance to secure wireless networks. The Alliance defined 
the protocol in response to several weaknesses researchers 
had found in the previous system: Wired Equivalent Privacy 
(WEP). Many sophisticated authentication and encryption 
techniques have been embedded into WPA2 but it still facing a 
lot of challenging situations. In this paper we discuss the 
benefit of WPA2, its vulnerability & weakness .This paper also 
present solutions or suggestions which will improve Wi-Fi 
Protected Access 2 (WPA2) protocol. 
Keywords : WPA 2, Key, Authentication, Hash Function, 
DH Algorithm,PRNG. 
 
ireless network has been an excellent invantion 
at the end of 20th century in inter-network 
communication. WiFi (wireless fidelity) is one of 
today’s leading wireless technologies (Paul Arana, INFS 
612 – Fall 2006) (by George Ou. June 2 2005). WiFi 
networks based on IEEE 802.11 standard are being 
widely deployed in different environment due to 
standardization and ease to use. It allows an Internet 
connection to be broadcast through radio waves. The 
waves can be picked up by WiFi receivers which is 
attached to computers, personal digital assistants or cell 
phones. As the businesses expanded wireless demands 
increased and have become necessity as the day 
passed. The networking world suffers from many 
problems with networks the wireless too are also more 
prone to problems. Though the problems related to 
wireless networks is been on constant track to be 
removed but the solutions are not always perfect.  
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The main two problems that have been faced 
by the wireless network are security and signal 
interference. The problem with security can never be 
solved fully but it can be minimized. Since 1990, many 
wireless security protocols have been designed and 
implemented, but none proved to be convincing with the 
security threats that come every day with new dangers 
to our systems and information. So, depending on the 
business needs and requirements it is very much 
important to address wireless network security more 
efficiently. Through the last two decades wireless 
network researchers have come with 3 main Security 
protocols: WEP, WPA and WPA2 (Paul Arana, INFS 612 
– Fall 2006). Wireless Equivalent Privacy) (WEP) was the 
first default encryption protocol introduced in the first 
IEEE 802.11 standard, received a great deal of coverage 
due to various technical failures in the protocol. WiFi 
protected access (WPA) came with the purpose of 
solving the problems in the WEP cryptography method. 
First WEP, then WPA are used to secure wireless 
communications were found inadequate due to many 
proven vulnerabilities so a new protocol was 
implemented, WiFi protected access 2 (WPA2) protocol 
(Paul Arana, INFS 612 – Fall 2006)( Microsoft TechNet. 
The Cable Guy. July 29 2005). WPA2 also known as 
IEEE 802.11i standard is an amendment to the 802.11 
standard which specifying security mechanisms for 
wireless networks. 
 
The WiFi security protocol (WPA2) has not yet 
addressed many security vulnerabilities in its process of 
authentication. The 4 process that the WPA2 has at 
present are given below. 
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Fig:1.  WPA2 or 802.11i operational phases 
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From the above picture, it is clear that the 
confidentiality and integrity are only defined in the 4th
step where the 1st 3 steps are not secured. So at those 
three steps the station (client, supplicant) or AP ( the 
authenticator) can be compromised (Paul Arana, INFS 
612 – Fall 2006) (Bulk Frank, 2006).
For Station
x When a station sends security policy a rouge AP 
can collect them and extract information based on 
the information on probe and beacons.
x When 802.1 x authentications takes place the PSK is 
transmitted on air in plain text, so any attacker 
through any software can capture what a station is 
sending through signals in air.
x At the 3rd step also the various keys like 
PTK,GTK,KEK,KCK are transmitted in plain text that 
can be captured and used by the attacker (Paul 
Arana, INFS 612 – Fall 2006)( Lehembre, Guillaume, 
2006).
For AP
x When an attacker sends security policies that have 
1 in 100 of chances to match with security policy of 
AP can compromise the AP itself.
x When an attacker also sends identity or PSK by a 
dictionary tool and a spoofed MAC, the AP is forced 
to send the authentication request to RADIUS 
server(Paul Arana, INFS 612 – Fall 2006) (George 
Ou. June 2 2005).
From above, both station and AP can be 
compromised. In that case some mechanism should be 
introduced to include some level of security to the
existing WPA2 system.
a) WPA2 Weaknesses
When a number of minor weaknesses have 
been discovered in WPA/ WPA2 since their release, 
none of them are too dangerous provided simple 
security recommendations are followed. 
The most practical vulnerability is the attack 
against WPA and WPA2’s PSK key .As already 
mentioned, the PSK provides an alternative to 802.1 x 
PMK generations using an authentication server. It is a 
string of 256 bits or a passphrase of 8 to 63 characters 
used to generate such a string using a known algorithm: 
PSK = PMK = PBKDF2 (password, SSID, SSID length, 
4096, 256) where PBKDF2 is a method used in 
PKCS#5, 4096 is the number of hashes and 256 is the 
length of the output(George Ou. June 2 2005) (Wi-Fi 
Alliance, Feb. 27 2005). The PTK is derived from the 
PMK, using the 4-Way Handshake and all information 
used to calculate its value is transmitted in plain text. 
Strength of PTK therefore relies only on the PMK value, 
which for PSK effectively means the strength of the 
passphrase. As indicated by Robert Moskowitz, second 
message of the 4-Way handshake (Paul Arana, INFS 
612 – Fall 2006) could be subjected to both dictionary 
and brute force offline attacks. 
b) WPA2 Authentication
One of the major changes introduced with the 
WPA2 standard is the separation of user authentication 
from the enforcement of message privacy and integrity, 
thereby providing a more scalable and robust security 
architecture suitable to home networks or corporate 
networks with equal prowess.
c) Personal Mode
Authentication in the WPA2 Personal mode, 
which does not require an authentication server and is 
performed between the client and the AP generating a 
256-bit PSK from a plain-text pass phrase (from 8 to 63 
characters) (Paul Arana, INFS 612 – Fall 2006). The PSK 
in conjunction with the Service Set Identifier and SSID 
length form the mathematical basis for the Pair-wise 
Master Key (PMK) to be used later in key generation.
d) Enterprise Mode
Authentication in Enterprise mode relies on the 
IEEE 802.1X authentication standard. The major 
components are the supplicant (client) joining the 
network, the authenticator (the AP serves) providing 
access control and the authentication server (RADIUS) 
making authorization decisions (Paul Arana, INFS 612 –
Fall 2006). The authenticator (AP) divides each virtual 
port into two logical ports: one for service and the other 
for authentication, making up the PAE (Port Access 
Entity). The authentication PAE always open to allow 
authentication frames through, while the service PAE is 
only open upon successful authentication by the 
RADIUS server. The supplicant and the authenticator 
communicate using Layer 2 EAPoL (EAP over LAN) 
(Bulk Frank, 2006) (Lehembre, Guillaume, 2006). 
Authenticator converts EAPoL messages to RADIUS 
messages and then forwards them to the RADIUS 
server. Authentication server (RADIUS), which must be 
compatible with the supplicant’s EAP types, receives 
and processes the authentication request (Paul Arana, 
INFS 612 – Fall 2006) (Microsoft TechNet. The Cable 
Guy. July 29 2005). Once the authentication process is 
complete the supplicant and authenticator have a secret 
Master Key (MK) as shown in Figure 2.
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Client Authenticator Authenticationserver
802.1X/EAP request identity
802.1X/EAP response identity
Radius access
Radius identity
EAP messages specific to the chosen method
MK derivation MK derivation
Radius accept
802.1X/EAP success
Fig: 2. 802.1x authentication [6]
Request for
communication & send
out a string
AP Client
Client
Hash
Function
Check
AP
Hash
Function
AP Client
Check
Send out a string as a
challenge to M.S
Calculate
the string
Message
digest
Message
digest
Calculate
the string
If different ceases
communication
Send message digest
Send message digest
If different ceases
communicationIf same, then continue
communication
Fig: 3. Authentication in secure way
e) Secure Authentication process by using Hash 
function
The security steps are as follows: 
Step1: Client request for communication & send 
out a string as a challenge to A.P. 
Step2 : A.P also sends out a string as a 
challenge to Client. 
Step3 : Client calculates the message digest of 
the string by applying hash algorithm and sends the 
challenging string value and its ISSI number to A.P. 
Step4 : A.P also calculates the message digest 
for the corresponding string & send to the Client. Only 
the legitimate A.P & Client knows the hash algorithm. 
But the evil M.S is not able to produce correct value for 
the given string.
A.P & Client compare the corresponding 
message digest value. If it match then continue further 
communication ,Otherwise, ceases the communication 
immediately.
f) WPA2 Key Generation
Key generation is accomplished by means of 
two handshakes: a 4-Way Handshake for PTK (Pair wise 
Transient Key) and GTK (Group Transient Key) 
derivation and a Group Key Handshake for GTK 
renewal. The 4-Way Handshake is accomplished by four 
EAPoL-Key messages between the client and the AP, is 
initiated by the access point and performs the following 
tasks:
x Confirm the client’s knowledge of the PMK. The 
PMK derivation, required to generate the PTK, is rely 
on the authentication method used. In WPA2 
Personal mode the PMK is derived from the 
authentication PSK and for WPA2 Enterprise mode 
the PMK is derived from the authentication MK (Paul 
Arana, INFS 612 – Fall 2006) (key hierarchy in Fig. 
6).
x Derive a fresh PTK, which is comprised of three 
types of keys: KCK (Key Confirmation Key – 128
bits) used to check the integrity of EAPoL-Key 
frames, Key Encryption Key(KEK – 128 bits) used to 
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encrypt the GTK and the Temporal Keys(TK – 128 
bits) used to secure data traffic (Paul Arana, INFS 
612 – Fall 2006).
x Install encryption and integrity keys. 
x Encrypt transport of the GTK which is calculated by 
the AP from a random Group Master Key (GMK).
x Confirm the cipher suite selection.
g) Key generation in a secure way
Symmetric key generation by DH algorithm     
DH key agreement is a key management 
method to share an encryption key with global variables 
known as prime number 'P' and 'G', 'G' is a primitive root 
of P. ‘a’ is the private key of Client, and ‘b’ is the private 
key of A.P. Client’s public key is PK
Client 
= G
a 
mod P and 
A.P's public key is PK
AP 
= G
b 
The DH key exchange protocol is described as 
follows where both A.P and Client exchange keys.
Compute
Public Key
X=G^a mod
P
Compute
Public Key
Y=G^b mod
P
Receive Client’s 
Public key Y
Receive A.P’s 
Public key Y
Compute
symmetric
key ka
Compute
symmetric
key kb
Encryption by key
Ka
Encryption by key
Kb
Acquire
No. P & G
Taken
private value
a & b
Send public key Y
Send public key X
a
b
AP Client
Ka=(PKA.P)^a Ka=(PKClient)^b
Fig: 4. Symmetric Key generation
A pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) is 
an algorithm for generating a sequence of numbers that 
approximates the properties of random numbers. The 
sequence is not truly random in that it is completely 
determine by a relatively small set of initial values, called 
the PRNG’s state. Although sequences that are closer to 
truly random can be generated using hardware random 
number generators, pseudorandom numbers are 
important in practice for simulation (e.g., physical 
system with Monte Carlo Method) and are central in the 
practice of cryptography and procedural generation. 
Common classes of these algorithms are linear 
congruential generators, Lagged Fibonacci generators, 
linear feedback shift registers, feedback with carry shift
registers and generalized feedback shift registers. 
Recent instances of pseudorandom algorithm include 
Blum Blum Shub, Fortuna and Mersenne twister. 
Blum Blum Shub (B.B.S.) is a pseudorandom
number generator proposed in 1986 by Lenore Blum, 
Manuel Blum and Michael Shub (Blum et al., 1986).
Blum Blum Shub takes the form:
where M=pq is the product of two large 
primes p and q. At each step of the algorithm, 
some output is derived from xn+1; the output is 
commonly either the bit parity of xn+1 or one or more 
of the least significant bits of xn+1.
The seed x0 should be an integer that's not
1 or co-prime to M (ie. p and q are not factors of x0).
The two primes, p and q, should both be 
congruent to 3 (mod 4) (this guarantees that each 
quadratic residue has one square root which is also 
a quadratic residue) and gcd(φ(p-1), φ(q-1)) should 
be small (this makes the cycle length large).
An interesting characteristic of the Blum 
Blum Shub generator is the possibility to calculate 
any xi value directly (via Euler's Theorem):
where λ is the Carmichael function. (Here we have).
a) Mersenne Twister
The Mersenne twister is a pseudorandom 
number generator developed in 1997 by Makoto 
Matsumoto and Takuji Nishimura that is based on a 
matrix linear recurrence over a finite binary field F2. It 
provides for fast generation of very high-quality 
pseudorandom numbers, having been designed 
specifically to rectify many of the flaws found in older 
algorithms.
Its name derives from the fact that period length 
is chosen to be a Mersenne prime. There are at least 
two common variants of the algorithm, differing only in 
the size of the Mersenne primes used. The newer and 
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more commonly used one is the Mersenne Twister 
MT19937, with 32-bit word length. There is also a variant 
with 64-bit word length, MT19937-64, which generates a 
different sequence.
For a k-bit word length, the Mersenne Twister 
generates numbers with an almost uniform distribution
in the range [0,2k − 1].
The Mersenne Twister algorithm is a twisted 
generalised feedback shift register (twisted GFSR, or 
TGFSR) of rational normal form (TGFSR(R)), with state 
bit reflection and tempering. It is characterized by the 
following quantities:
x w: word size (in number of bits)
x n: degree of recurrence
x m: middle word, or the number of parallel                                               
sequences, 1 ≤ m ≤ n
x r: separation point of one word, or the number of 
bits of the lower bitmask, 0 ≤ r ≤ w - 1
x a: coefficients of the rational normal form twist 
matrix
x b, c: TGFSR(R) tempering bitmasks
x s, t: TGFSR(R) tempering bit shifts
x u, l: additional Mersenne Twister tempering bit shifts 
with the restriction that 2nw − r − 1 is a Mersenne 
prime. This choice simplifies the primitivity test and 
k-distribution test that are needed in the parameter 
search.
For a word x with w bit width, it is expressed as 
the recurrence relation
with | as the bitwise or and as the bitwise 
exclusive or (XOR), xu, xl being x with upper and lower 
bitmasks applied. The twist transformation A is defined 
in rational normal form
with In − 1 as the (n − 1) × (n − 1) identity matrix 
(and in contrast to normal matrix multiplication, bitwise 
XOR replaces addition). The rational normal form has 
the benefit that it can be efficiently expressed as
Where
In order to achieve the 2nw − r − 1 theoretical 
upper limit of the period in a TGFSR, φB(t) must be a 
primitive polynomial, φB(t) being the characteristic 
polynomial of
The twist transformation improves the classical 
GFSR with the following key properties:
x Period reaches the theoretical upper limit 2nw − r − 1 
(except if initialized with 0)
x Equidistribution in n dimensions (e.g. linear 
congruential generators can at best manage 
reasonable distribution in 5 dimensions)
As like TGFSR(R), the Mersenne Twister is 
cascaded with a tempering transform to compensate for 
the reduced dimensionality of equidistribution (because 
of the choice of A being in the rational normal form), 
which is equivalent to the transformation A = R →
A = T−1RT, T invertible. The tempering is defined in the 
case of Mersenne Twister as
y := x ӻ (x >> u)
y := :y ӻ ((y << s) & b)
y := :y ӻ ((y << t) & c)
z := y ӻ (y >> l)
with <<, >> as the bitwise left and right shifts, 
and & as the bitwise and. The first and last transforms 
are added in order to improve lower bit equidistribution. 
From the property of TGFSR, 
is required to reach the upper 
bound of equidistribution for the upper bits.
The coefficients for MT19937 are:
x (w, n, m, r) = (32, 624, 397, 31)
x a = 9908B0DF16
x u = 11
x (s, b) = (7, 9D2C568016)
x (t, c) = (15, EFC6000016)
x l = 18
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A Lagged Fibonacci generator (LFG) is an 
example of a pseudorandom number generator. This
class of random number generator is aimed at being an 
improvement on the 'standard' linear congruential 
generator. These are based on a generalization of the 
Fibonacci sequence.
x The Fibonacci sequence may be described by the 
recurrence relation:
x Sn = Sn − 1 + Sn − 2
x Hence, the new term is the sum of the last two 
terms in the sequence. This can be generalized to 
the sequence:
xx In which case, the new term is some combination of 
any two previous terms. m is usually a power of 2 
(m = 2M), often 232 or 264. The operator denotes a 
general binary operation. This may be either 
addition, subtraction, multiplication, or the bitwise
arithmetic exclusive-or operator (XOR). The theory 
of this type of generator is rather complex, and it 
may not be sufficient simply to choose random 
values for j and k. These generators also tend to be 
very sensitive to initialization.
x Generators of this type employ k words of state 
(they 'remember' the last k values).
x If the operation used is addition, then the generator 
is described as an Additive Lagged Fibonacci 
Generator or ALFG, if multiplication is used, it is a 
Multiplicative Lagged Fibonacci Generator or MLFG, 
and if the XOR operation is used, it is called a Two-
tap generalised feedback shift register or GFSR. 
The Mersenne twister algorithm is a variation on a 
GFSR. The GFSR is also related to the Linear 
Feedback Shift Register, or LFSR.
Properties of Lagged Fibonacci Generators
x Lagged Fibonacci generators have a maximum 
period of (2k - 1)*2M-1 if addition or subtraction is 
used, and (2k-1)*k if exclusive-or operations are 
used to combine the previous values. If, on the 
other hand, multiplication is used, the maximum 
period is (2k - 1)*2M-3, or 1/4 of period of the additive 
case.
x For the generator to achieve this maximum period, 
the polynomial:
x y = xk + xj + 1
x must be primitive over the integers mod 2. Values of 
j and k satisfying this constraint have been 
published in the literature. Popular pairs are:
x {j = 7, k = 10}, {j = 5, k = 17}, {j = 24, k = 55}, {j 
= 65, k = 71}, {j = 128, k = 159} [1], {j = 6, k = 
31}, {j = 31, k = 63}, {j = 97, k = 127}, {j = 353, 
k = 521}, {j = 168, k = 521}, {j = 334, k = 607}, 
{j = 273, k = 607}, {j = 418, k = 1279} ( "IEEE 
802.11i." Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. 11 Nov 
2006)
x Another list of possible values for j and k is on page 
29 of volume 2 of The Art of Computer 
Programming:
x (24,55), (38,89), (37,100), (30,127), (83,258), 
(107,378), (273,607), (1029,2281), (576,3217), 
(4187,9689), (7083,19937), (9739,23209)
x Note that the smaller numbers have short periods 
(only a few "random" numbers are generated before 
the first "random" number is repeated and the 
sequence restarts).
x It is required that at least one of the first k values
chosen to initialize the generator be odd.
x It has been suggested that good ratios between j 
and k are approximately the golden ratio
In this paper, an overview of security scheme in 
WiFi is presented. Attacks on authentication can be 
described as the ways by which a network can be 
intruded and the privacy of the users is compromised; if 
the user authentication and authorization stage is 
compromised. Therefore, the ways to breach the 
authentication frameworks are termed as attacks on 
privacy and key management protocols. But the hash 
based authentication protocol will protect this type of 
interception. We also proposed secure symmetric key 
generation process by using DH algorithm & also 
PRNG. This will prevent a key misuse & save band width 
in the multi- and broadcast services. We also used DH 
key exchange protocol to fit it into WiFi network to 
eliminate existing weakness of unencrypted 
management communication message.
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Vulnerabilities of Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 (WPA2)”, 
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Inc. Nov. 25 2006<http://en.wikipedia.org/
w/index.php?title= IEEE_802.1 1i&oldid=
87121019>
3. “Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 Data Encryption and 
Integrity.” Microsoft TechNet. The Cable Guy. July 
29 2005.<http://www.microsoft.com/ technet/
community/columns/cabl eguy/cg0805.mspx>
4. “Understanding the updated WPA and WPA2 
standards”.ZDNet Blogs. Posted by George Ou. 
June 2 2005. <http://blogs.zdnet.com/Ou/?p=67>
5. “Deploying Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPAtm) and 
WPA2tm in the Enterprise.” Wi-Fi Alliance, Feb. 27
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